Student ID: IoTE-775 # Sricam SP009 # In this gist I will try to examine and exploit the Sricam SP009. I purchased it from the IOT Exploitation Kit. 1. First Recon * doing Research on Manufacturer Details * reassamble the ip-camera 2. Access over Harware Ports * finding ports * verify the used protocol * getting access to the OS * getting firmware 3. Acess over Wireless Interfaces and Network * use interfaces in intended manner and dump network exchange information * fuzz wireless interfaces 4. Reversing Android App * finding firmware and keys for further access encryption * API logic for cloud access * vulnerabilities ## 1. First Recon ## There isn't any manufactural ID on the Cam. So seaching for the product will probably give the necessary documents. http://www.sricam.com/product/id/07caa85ec45449fabc17c003345970bf.html http://www.sricam.com/download/id/3e984aa70a9d4e928b03c01787d6fb4f.html I wasn't able of extracting any relevant FCCID, only for similiar models like SP022. ![Product_photo](http://i.imgur.com/6UA9B3B.png) Examing product without opening it reveals a 720p camera module, IR sensor, LED's for indicating running system, SD card slot and a reset button. On the backshell of the camera is a sticker with the ID (probably for network issues) and the default password.

outer Side of backshell with product sticker

inner Side of backshell with speaker
On the inner side of the backshell lies a small speaker. It was my first action to plug it off the main board, because it does annoying beeps when not paired. The main board reveals all the parts for the functionalities of the cam. ![Main_front](http://i.imgur.com/Y7b0J4q.jpg) #### WiFi #### * Link: https://www.mediatek.com/products/broadbandWifi/mt7601u * Identifier: MT7601UN 1530-BMJL GTP39Y55 According to mediatek "High-performance 802.11n for compact and cost-effective Wi-Fi devices". #### SoC #### * Link: http://www.grain-media.com/html/8136S_8135S.htm * Identifier: GM8 135S-OC SMSKH-000 AG-1525 ![Chip_arch](http://i.imgur.com/IPcaKkf.jpg) We can see that it's a ARM architecture. Next to the SoC lies the suspected UART interface. #### Flash #### * Link: http://html.alldatasheet.com/html-pdf/575542/MCNIX/MX25L12835E/1114/7/MX25L12835E.html (similiar model) * Identifier: MX25L12805E (on the chip is MX25L12805D printed) * Name: 16M-BIT [x 1] CMOS SERIAL FLASH ![Flash_Pinout](http://i.imgur.com/P08A3rZ.png) => new pic It surprised me, that according to the datasheet, the chip got 16 instead of 8 pins. We will examine later, whether it's possible to get some information from the chip via SPI. #### Power Management #### * Link: http:/A3/www.everanalog.com/Product/ProductEA3036DetailInfo.aspx * Identifier: EA3036 4j088s * Name: 3CH power management IC On the back of the main board are some other parts. ![Main_back](http://i.imgur.com/2wa6WmI.jpg) #### EEPROM #### * Link: http://www.celtor.pl/2447,24c04d-eeprom-szeregowa-4kb-512bx-so8.html * Identifier: 24c04d 538b1 #### Audio Amplifier #### * Link: http://www.inkocean.in/the-md8002a-8002a-sop8-smd-3w-audio-amplifier-ic-chip * Identifier: 8002a swire15 The WiFi antenna is stucked in the front shell of the camera.

front shell with attached WIFI antenna
Inside this front shell lies this "LED ring" with some status LED's and the IR sensor for measuring brightness, I guess.

LED circuit back side

LED circuit front side
## 2. Access over Hardware Ports ## Without taking further measurements, I suspected the three pins in previous picture to be a UART serial port. As the first one has a squareformed joint, it's supposed to be the GND pin and the two other ones Tx and Rx. ![Buspirate_Setup](http://i.imgur.com/kjnXzwU.jpg) I examined the ports with a buspirate and beeing sure I have the right ports, I tried all popular baudrates and parity bits: ```bash HiZ>m #Choose protocol from main buspirate interface 1. HiZ 2. 1-WIRE 3. UART 4. I2C 5. SPI 6. 2WIRE 7. 3WIRE 8. LCD 9. DIO x. exit(without change) (1)>3 #taking UART Set serial port speed: (bps) 1. 300 2. 1200 3. 2400 4. 4800 5. 9600 6. 19200 7. 38400 8. 57600 9. 115200 10. BRG raw value (1)>9 #taking baudrate 115200 Data bits and parity: 1. 8, NONE *default 2. 8, EVEN 3. 8, ODD 4. 9, NONE (1)> # taking default value "no parity" Stop bits: 1. 1 *default 2. 2 (1)> # taking default value "no stop bits" Receive polarity: 1. Idle 1 *default 2. Idle 0 (1)> # is the Rx port high or low when it's idle, taking default Select output type: 1. Open drain (H=Hi-Z, L=GND) 2. Normal (H=3.3V, L=GND) (1)> # taking open drain as driver circuit for the port Ready UART>v # checking the Pinout of the BusPirate Pinstates: 1.(BR) 2.(RD) 3.(OR) 4.(YW) 5.(GN) 6.(BL) 7.(PU) 8.(GR) 9.(WT) 0.(Blk) GND 3.3V 5.0V ADC VPU AUX - TxD - RxD P P P I I I I I I I GND 0.00V 0.00V 0.00V 0.00V L L L L L UART>(2) # choosing mode to only receive output Raw UART input Any key to exit >�ʛ���s�Ϲܒ`���e����k��������������ʗ���0�����������������컚�Ϙ�ߚЛ�������������%�������i���C�������q ��q����"�c9�a�":�i���C�������q ��q����"�c9�a�"���i���C�������q ��q����"�c9�a�"���i�� ... q ��)���"��c9ñ":��C��������q ;�)���"�c9ñ":��C��������q ;�)���"�c9ñ":�i ``` Trying all different baudrates and parity bits didn't give any better result. With a hint of @adi_1318 was it easy. The square pin isn't GND, it's RX (RX,GND,TX) on baudrate of 115200. ![Uart_soldering](http://i.imgur.com/ZIkf5W2.jpg) So first lesson learned: Never trust in habits. With this Pinning I was able to get readable output and furthermore a shell without Write Rights. For the sake of readabilty I will put booting output into external link. https://github.com/herrfeder/Offensive_IOT_Exploitation/blob/master/gist_files/booting_output.txt It gives some interesting information. - The flash is similar to the suspected one, but has only 16MiB of storage. - Flash software is iJFFS2 version 2.2. (NAND) from Red Hat - Flash communicates via SPI and creates 6 partitions on the flash ``` SPI_FLASH spi0.0: MX25L12845E (16384 Kbytes) Creating 6 MTD partitions on "nor-flash": 0x000000010000-0x000000080000 : "UBOOT" 0x000000080000-0x000000380000 : "LINUX" 0x000000380000-0x000000b00000 : "FS" 0x000000b00000-0x000000c00000 : "USER0" 0x000000c00000-0x000001000000 : "USER1" 0x000000000000-0x000001000000 : "ALL" ``` - OS runs Linux with busybox on squashfs filesystem - DRAM is 64 MiB - we have USB interfaces (probably for the SD Card Reader) ``` Drive Vbus because of ID pin shows Device A fotg210 fotg210.0: FOTG2XX fotg210 fotg210.0: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 1 fotg210 fotg210.0: irq 9, io mem 0x93000000 fotg210 fotg210.0: USB 2.0 started, EHCI 1.00 hub 1-0:1.0: USB hub found hub 1-0:1.0: 1 port detected ``` - there is a I2C bus ``` i2c /dev entries driver ftiic010 ftiic010.0: irq 18, mapped at 84860000 I2C hangs detection thread started! ``` - uses lib80211 for WiFi functionalities After getting through booting and many applies of doing some OS tasks we have a shell. The shell will be harassed by intervalled output of WiFi Core that indicates it's in STA mode and scans for a certain AP. #### Getting Firmware #### 1. Finding link in the sourcecode of APK * this part will be handled in the reversing part 2. Dumping from System via SDCard * We can get nearly the whole filesystem by simply copying it onto an sdcard. * It will be mounted as /mnt/disk1. 3. Dumping Flash via SPI ##### 2. Dumping from System via SDCard ##### ``` /mnt # mmc0: new high speed SDHC card at address e624 mmcblk0: mmc0:e624 SU08G 7.40 GiB mmcblk0: found removeable disk1 mount removeable disk1 OK dwDiscState = 2 /# cp -r / /mnt/disk1/ ``` Searching for interesting info bits in the file system ``` # ..e/david/offensiveIOT/ip_cam/filesystem # grep -rli aes npc/npc patch/bin/wpa_supplicant patch/lib/mt7601Usta_v2.ko lib/modules/ms.ko # ..e/david/offensiveIOT/ip_cam/filesystem # grep -rli firmware npc/npc patch/bin/ifrename patch/lib/mt7601Usta_v2.ko gm/bin/busybox gm/tools/ethtool ``` The directory npc with the executable npc seems to be very interesting: ``` /npc # ls dhcp.script minihttpd.conf patch txt wPipe gwellipc mtd pipe_create upgfile_ok img npc sound version.txt /npc # cat npc | grep aes aes-128-ecb aes-128-cbc aes-128-ofb aes-128-cfb aes-192-ecb aes-192-cbc aes-192-ofb aes-192-cfb aes-256-ecb aes-256-cbc aes-256-ofb aes-256-cfb aes-128-cfb1 aes-192-cfb1 aes-256-cfb1 aes-128-cfb8 aes-192-cfb8 aes-256-cfb8 id-aes128-wrap id-aes192-wrap id-aes256-wrap e_aes.c aes key setup failed /npc # cat npc | grep -i password Password PasswordType RemotlySetPassword Super_Password *cESSID:%s,cPassword:%s,dwEncType = %d challengePassword id-PasswordBasedMAC password based MAC userPassword bad password read problems getting password CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo SetApMode Essid and Password Fail! AP MODE :password is too long! PASSWORD password is empty Set Password fgCheckMessageAck password incrrect Password Fail IP=%d Counter=%d dwPassword=%d Super Password verify OK (idle calling help) ... Two Password verify OK (idle calling help) ... manager Password verify OK (idle calling help) ... Guest Password verify OK (idle calling help) ... Password verify Fail 00 ... No Password , Pass Super Password verify ok3 ... two Password verify ok3 ... manager Password verify ok3 ... guest Password verify ok3 ... Password verify Fail3 ... Super Password verify OK 2... Super+manager Password verify OK 2... Manager Password verify OK 2... Guest Password verify OK 2... Password verify fail 2... No manager password, in lan 2 Super Password verify OK 1... Super + manager Password verify OK 1... Manager Password verify OK 1... Guest Password verify OK 1... Password verify fail 1... Lan , no password Super Password super+manager Password Password verify OK1 ... Password verify fail 1... ``` npc has a lot of strings in it related to encrypting and network authentication. It's necessary to obtain this binary from the filesystem to examine it in detail. I will look in the reversing part at the npc and other interesting binaries. I wasn't able to find any fruitful info in cleartext on the system. ##### 3. Dumping Flash via SPI ##### My initial concept was to use the Attify Badge with the description from the IOT Exploitation Manual with the tool spiflash (https://github.com/devttys0/libmpsse). As I own a Testclip for 8-pin DIP-Chips, I can simply attach it to the Flash Chip with the following pinning:

Testclip on the Flash Chip

Pinning of the Testclip Cable
![Image](http://i.imgur.com/8q7AWW3.jpg) It will sucessfully detect the Flash Chip probably indicated by the zeros: ``` oit@ubuntu> ~/tools/libmpsse/src/examples $ sudo python spiflash.py -i [sudo] password for oit: FT232H Future Technology Devices International, Ltd initialized at 15000000 hertz 00 00 00 ``` Now I will try to dump it's memory to a file. We need some information to do so like the address offset where the firmware image starts and the size of memory. We know from the booting process that the uBoot Partition starts at 0x10000 (int 65536) and the memory size is 16MiB (16*1024*1024). So we can try to start the script with the right params: ``` oit@ubuntu> ~/tools/libmpsse/src/examples $ sudo python spiflash.py -a 65536 -s 167510016 -r ip_cam.bin FT232H Future Technology Devices International, Ltd initialized at 15000000 hertz Reading 167510016 bytes starting at address 0x10000...saved to ip_cam.bin. ``` But when looking into the file, it only has 0x0000 in it: ``` oit@ubuntu> ~/tools/libmpsse/src/examples $ hexdump ip_cam.bin 0000000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 * 9fc0000 ``` After some research I saw that others struggled with the same problem: - https://github.com/Marzogh/SPIFlash/issues/37 - https://www.ghostlyhaks.com/forum/rom-eeprom-bios-efi-uefi/64-can-t-dump-or-read-mx25l6406e-chip I decided to give the Bus Pirate a try with the tool flashrom (https://www.flashrom.org/Bus_Pirate) as it's supports the BusPirate directly. I got the BusPirate SPI Pinning: ``` SPI>v Pinstates: 1.(BR) 2.(RD) 3.(OR) 4.(YW) 5.(GN) 6.(BL) 7.(PU) 8.(GR) 9.(WT) 0.(Blk) GND 3.3V 5.0V ADC VPU AUX CLK MOSI CS MISO P P P I I I O O O I GND 0.00V 0.00V 0.00V 0.00V L L L L L ``` and connected it to the Testclip, following: ![Image](http://i.imgur.com/CqYLtBW.jpg) Using the command for flashrom to write the memory into file : ``` oit@ubuntu> ~/tools/ $ flashrom -V -p buspirate_spi:dev=/dev/ttyUSB0,spispeed=1M -r MX25L128.bin -c MX25L12835F/MX25L12845E/MX25L12865E flashrom v0.9.9-r1954 on Linux 4.7.0-kali1-amd64 (x86_64) flashrom is free software, get the source code at https://flashrom.org flashrom was built with libpci 3.5.2, GCC 6.3.0 20170221, little endian Command line (7 args): flashrom -V -p buspirate_spi:dev=/dev/ttyUSB0,spispeed=1M -r MX25L128.bin -c MX25L12835F/MX25L12845E/MX25L12865E Calibrating delay loop... OS timer resolution is 1 usecs, 2605M loops per second, 10 myus = 11 us, 100 myus = 111 us, 1000 myus = 1025 us, 10000 myus = 10064 us, 4 myus = 5 us, OK. Initializing buspirate_spi programmer Detected Bus Pirate hardware v3b Detected Bus Pirate firmware 5.10 Using SPI command set v2. SPI speed is 1MHz Raw bitbang mode version 1 Raw SPI mode version 1 The following protocols are supported: SPI. Probing for Macronix MX25L12835F/MX25L12845E/MX25L12865E, 16384 kB: probe_spi_rdid_generic: id1 0xc2, id2 0x2018 Found Macronix flash chip "MX25L12835F/MX25L12845E/MX25L12865E" (16384 kB, SPI) on buspirate_spi. Chip status register is 0x00. Chip status register: Status Register Write Disable (SRWD, SRP, ...) is not set Chip status register: Bit 6 is not set Chip status register: Block Protect 3 (BP3) is not set Chip status register: Block Protect 2 (BP2) is not set Chip status register: Block Protect 1 (BP1) is not set Chip status register: Block Protect 0 (BP0) is not set Chip status register: Write Enable Latch (WEL) is not set Chip status register: Write In Progress (WIP/BUSY) is not set This chip may contain one-time programmable memory. flashrom cannot read and may never be able to write it, hence it may not be able to completely clone the contents of this chip (see man page for details). Reading flash... ``` This process takes very long but after nearly an hour it finished and I was able to examine a firmware binary: ``` oit@ubuntu> ~/tools/ $ strings MX25L128.bin | grep -i gcc arm-unknown-linux-uclibcgnueabi-gcc (Buildroot 2012.02) 4.4.0 20100318 (experimental) GcC\M jGcc ``` Link for the binary: https://github.com/herrfeder/Offensive_IOT_Exploitation/blob/master/gist_files/ip_cam_firmware.bin Some other interesting links for this purpose: - http://freneticrapport.blogspot.de/2010/10/how-to-restore-bios-after-bad-flash.html - http://hackaday.com/2009/06/30/parts-spi-eeprom-25aa25lc/ - https://medium.com/@rxseger/spi-interfacing-experiments-eeproms-bus-pirate-adc-opt101-with-raspberry-pi-9c819511efea ## 3. Acess over Wireless Interfaces and Network ## The UI experience of the App for communicating with the Cam is really bad and I wasn't patient enough, to set up WiFi connectivity with the App. In first glance I suspected it would setup open AP and I can simply connect to it but it doesn't. There is some functionality to connect to another existent WiFi by capturing with the Camea App generated QR-Code. I took another way and examined the OS of the Cam to find out what it is up to. ``` /etc/network # cat interfaces auto lo iface lo inet loopback iface eth0 inet static address 172.19.78.3 broadcast 172.31.255.255 netmask 255.240.0.0 gateway 172.19.78.2 pre-up /sbin/insmod /lib/modules/2.6.14/extra/ftmac100.ko post-down /sbin/rmmod ftmac100.ko # no hints in the configuration on the interfaces /etc # cat wpa_supplicant0.conf ctrl_interface=/etc/Wireless network={ ssid="Free-AP0" key_mgmt=NONE } # but a wpa_supplicant conf with a given SSID ``` As I setted up an open AP with the SSID "Free-AP0" the Cam connects immediately to it. ``` CH 1 ][ Elapsed: 6 s ][ 2017-08-17 18:16 ][ paused output BSSID PWR RXQ Beacons #Data, #/s CH MB ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID 00:C0:CA:62:41:8F -9 100 90 13 0 1 54 OPN Free-AP0 BSSID STATION PWR Rate Lost Frames Probe 00:C0:CA:62:41:8F F8:0C:F3:FF:5F:6C 14 54 - 6 0 11 # Smartphone with App 00:C0:CA:62:41:8F 20:F4:1B:5C:07:AD -19 1 - 1 0 5 # IPCam ``` To set up open or WEP/WPA access points quickly with internet access, I recommend the little bashtool qw (https://github.com/file-not-found/qw). Prequesities are hostapd and dnsmasque. You can do it with hostapd by bridging or routing the connectivity manually. ``` root@greenpc2 ~/wlan # ./qw ap Free-AP0 wlan0 Enter passphrase (leave blank for open network): Configuration file: /tmp/qw_1_hostapd.conf Using interface wlan0 with hwaddr 00:c0:ca:62:41:8f and ssid "Free-AP0" wlan0: interface state UNINITIALIZED->ENABLED wlan0: AP-ENABLED wlan0: STA f8:0c:f3:ff:5f:6c IEEE 802.11: authenticated # smartphone tries to connect wlan0: STA f8:0c:f3:ff:5f:6c IEEE 802.11: associated (aid 1) wlan0: AP-STA-CONNECTED f8:0c:f3:ff:5f:6c wlan0: STA f8:0c:f3:ff:5f:6c RADIUS: starting accounting session C7E9972B18913018 Unsupported authentication algorithm (1) handle_auth_cb: STA 20:f4:1b:5c:07:ad not found Unsupported authentication algorithm (1) handle_auth_cb: STA 20:f4:1b:5c:07:ad not found wlan0: STA 20:f4:1b:5c:07:ad IEEE 802.11: authenticated # IPCam tries to connect wlan0: STA 20:f4:1b:5c:07:ad IEEE 802.11: associated (aid 2) wlan0: AP-STA-CONNECTED 20:f4:1b:5c:07:ad wlan0: STA 20:f4:1b:5c:07:ad RADIUS: starting accounting session 611E6C4DC8EFDE0C ``` => fuzzing wifi As the IPCam has network connection we will take the first step of network recon and scan the IPCam itself: ``` root@greenpc2 /home/david # nmap 10.0.0.21 Starting Nmap 7.50 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-08-15 15:10 CEST Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.21 Host is up (0.022s latency). Not shown: 998 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE 554/tcp open rtsp # streaming video data locally 5000/tcp open upnp # connect to distanced web server, will probably open port on router MAC Address: 20:F4:1B:5C:07:AD (Shenzhen Bilian electronic) ``` As it has an open upnp port I suspected it to open a port on a router, when it is allowed to. I checked this out on a FritzBox but it doesn't open a port automatically. There is a telnet daemon on the device. It seems to work: ``` root@greenpc2 /home/david # nmap 10.0.0.21 Starting Nmap 7.50 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-08-15 15:23 CEST Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.21 Host is up (0.20s latency). Not shown: 997 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE 23/tcp open telnet 554/tcp open rtsp 5000/tcp open upnp MAC Address: 20:F4:1B:5C:07:AD (Shenzhen Bilian electronic) ``` ##### Trying Interacting/Accessing the provided services ##### To get a more detailed view of provided services we will use nmap again to fingerprint the previous found ports and services. => NMAP As it provides a service header on the UPNP port I accessed it via Webbrowser at first. It shows a SOAP XML-API that want's to be served. ``` SOAP-ENV:Client HTTP GET method not implemented ``` Now I need to get know how to communicate with such api. This link can help: http://forums.opto22.com/t/how-to-send-soap-messages/951/9 In addition I was searching for "soap" string in the filesystem, it will reveal that binary npc holds the gSoap service and used headers and SOAP elements. => communicate via curl use exploit/linux/http/realtek_miniigd_upnp_exec_noauth use exploit/linux/http/dlink_upnp_exec_noauth # miranda -i wlan0 -v Binding to interface wlan0 ... Verbose mode enabled! upnp> msearch Entering discovery mode for 'upnp:rootdevice', Ctl+C to stop... msf > use auxiliary/scanner/upnp/ssdp_msearch msf auxiliary(ssdp_msearch) > set RHOSTS 10.0.1.25/32 msf auxiliary(ssdp_msearch) > run [*] Sending UPnP SSDP probes to 10.0.1.25->10.0.1.25 (1 hosts) [*] No SSDP endpoints found. [*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete) [*] Auxiliary module execution completed Regarding UPnP, this is an interesting presentation: http://toor.do/DEFCON-19-Garcia-UPnP-Mapping-WP.pdf http://toor.do/upnp.html There was released a quite fresh Exploit "Devil's Ivy" of the service gSoap in several versions. This will be handled in another write up. As I suspect an encrypted connection between IPCam, Smartphone and Backend Server, we need to sniff directly on the IPCam or the smartphone. I guess, it's much easier on the Phone. My smartphone for experimenting is rooted. This is necessary for sniffing raw traffic on the network. I downloaded tcpdump for android (http://www.androidtcpdump.com/) and load it into the phone. For placing and executing an external binary are only a few places appropriate in the android file system. You can use /data/local/tmp or /sdcard/tmp or maybe some other. With adb we can control our Phone now. ``` $ adb shell #opening shell on android phone shell@mako:/ $ su root@mako:/data/local/tmp # ./tcpdump -n -s 0 -w ipcam_cap tcpdump: listening on wlan0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes ^C16598 packets captured 16598 packets received by filter 0 packets dropped by kernel root@mako:/data/local/tmp # ls hexdump.bin ipcam_cap tcpdump ``` I was trying to trigger many activities in the communication between App and IPCam to get interesting traffic. There was interesting traffic. It will be paired with the related App activity. To filter all the Android and Google Stuff it's useful to filter some IP's. I use wireshark for this: file smartphone_10.0.0.27_ipcam_10.0.0.21.cap ``` not ip.addr == 172.217.22.99 && not ip.addr == 216.58.205.0/24 && ip.addr == 10.0.0.0/24 ```

Register Screenshot 1

Register Screenshot 2

Login Check

Answer for existing login

Add Friend / Add camera to personal dash

After adding => Get Friends List

Add Friend Capture

Reply for existing login

Get Friends List

Delete Friend

Get Version

Reply for version
The app delivers the possibility of doing a firmware update of the IPCam. Of course, I captured this: file firmware_upgrade.cap But there isn't any obvious activity in the file, that would point out a firmware upgrade. Only many udp traffic between smartphone and IPCam. Following this UDP stream over the whole capture: ``` `...}E.k............4...`...}E.k............4...`...}E.k............4...`...~E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`...~E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ....... ...`....E.k.... ....... ...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... .......!...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ....... ...`....E.k.... .......!...`....E.k.... ......."...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ....... ...`....E.k.... .......!...`....E.k.... ......."...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... .........dm..`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k.... .......(...`....E.k.... .......)...`....E.k.... .......*...`....E.k.... .......+...`....E.k.... .......,...`....E.k.... .......-...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ......./...`....E.k.... .......0...`....E.k.... .......1...`....E.k.... .......2...`....E.k.... .......3...`....E.k.... .......)...`....E.k.... .......*...`....E.k.... .......+...`....E.k.... .......,...`....E.k.... .......-...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ......./...`....E.k.... .......0...`....E.k.... .......1...`....E.k.... .......2...`....E.k.... .......3...`....E.k.... .......*...`....E.k.... .......+...`....E.k.... .......,...`....E.k.... .......-...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ......./...`....E.k.... .......0...`....E.k.... .......1...`....E.k.... .......2...`....E.k.... .......3...`....E.k.... .......4...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......6...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......6...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......6...`....E.k.... .......7...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......6...`....E.k.... .......7...`....E.k.... .......8...`....E.k.... .......N...`....E.k.... .......I...`....E.k.... .......J...`....E.k.... .......K...`....E.k.... .......L...`....E.k.... .......M...`....E.k.... .......N...`....E.k.... .......O...`....E.k.... .......J...`....E.k.... .......K...`....E.k.... .......L...`....E.k.... .......M...`....E.k.... .......N...`....E.k.... .......O...`....E.k.... .......J...`....E.k.... .......K...`....E.k.... .......L...`....E.k.... .......M...`....E.k.... .......N...`....E.k.... .......O...`....E.k.... .......P...`....E.k.... .......Q...`....E.k.... .......Q...`....E.k.... .......R...`....E.k.... .......Q...`....E.k.... .......R...`....E.k.... .......S...`....E.k.... .......S...`....E.k.... .......T...`....E.k.... .......T...`....E.k.... .......U...`....E.k.... .......U...`....E.k.... .......U...`....E.k.... .......V...`....E.k.... .......U...`....E.k.... .......V...`....E.k.... .......W...`....E.k.... .......W...`....E.k.... .......W...`....E.k.... .......em..`...}E.k............4...`...}E.k............4...`...}E.k............4...`...~E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`...~E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ....... ...`....E.k.... ....... ...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ....... ...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... .......!...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ....... ...`....E.k.... .......!...`....E.k.... ......."...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ....... ...`....E.k.... .......!...`....E.k.... ......."...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ....... ...`....E.k.... .......!...`....E.k.... ......."...`....E.k.... .......#...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k...."...8. .dm..`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k............4...`....E.k.... .......(...`....E.k.... .......)...`....E.k.... .......*...`....E.k.... .......+...`....E.k.... .......,...`....E.k.... .......-...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ......./...`....E.k.... .......0...`....E.k.... .......1...`....E.k.... .......2...`....E.k.... .......3...`....E.k.... .......)...`....E.k.... .......*...`....E.k.... .......+...`....E.k.... .......,...`....E.k.... .......-...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ......./...`....E.k.... .......0...`....E.k.... .......1...`....E.k.... .......2...`....E.k.... .......3...`....E.k.... .......*...`....E.k.... .......+...`....E.k.... .......,...`....E.k.... .......-...`....E.k.... ...........`....E.k.... ......./...`....E.k.... .......0...`....E.k.... .......1...`....E.k.... .......2...`....E.k.... .......3...`....E.k.... .......4...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......6...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......6...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......6...`....E.k.... .......7...`....E.k.... .......5...`....E.k.... .......6...`....E.k.... .......7...`....E.k.... .......8...`....E.k.... .......N...`....E.k.... .......I...`....E.k.... .......J...`....E.k.... .......K...`....E.k.... .......L...`....E.k.... .......M...`....E.k.... .......N...`....E.k.... .......O...`....E.k.... .......J...`....E.k.... .......K...`....E.k.... .......L...`....E.k.... .......M...`....E.k.... .......N...`....E.k.... .......O...`....E.k.... .......J...`....E.k.... .......K...`....E.k.... .......L...`....E.k.... .......M...`....E.k.... .......N...`....E.k.... .......O...`....E.k.... .......P...`....E.k.... .......Q...`....E.k.... .......Q...`....E.k.... .......R...`....E.k.... .......Q...`....E.k.... .......R...`....E.k.... .......S...`....E.k.... .......S...`....E.k.... .......T...`....E.k.... .......T...`....E.k.... .......U...`....E.k.... .......U...`....E.k.... .......U...`....E.k.... .......V...`....E.k.... .......U...`....E.k.... .......V...`....E.k.... .......W...`....E.k.... .......W...`....E.k.... .......W...`....E.k.... .......X...`....E.k.... .......X...`....E.k.... .......Y...`....E.k.... .......Y...`....E.k.... .......Z...`....E.k.... .......Z...`...gE.k...."...8. .em.. ``` As the file is to small for including a firmware stream and examining this "regelmaessig" structure something went wrong on capturing the firmware upgrade. Applying more filter to see communication between Laptop and the remote feature on videoipcamera.cn/view. Requires Internet Explorer to use it. There is a lot of traffic with three participants, so I have to use multiple rules and append only the file with the already filtered packets: file access_point_cap_laptop_10.0.1.36_website_101.1.17.22_filtered.cap ``` not ip.addr == 172.217.22.99 && not ip.addr == 216.58.205.234 && ip.addr == 101.1.17.22 && ip.addr == 10.0.1.36 && http.request ``` This will reveal a lot of GET requests to videoipcamera.cn and a binary setup.exe on http://videoipcamera.cn/view/setup.exe. This is necessary to use the cam-client on a PC. By the way, installing and starting it on Windows 10 and Windows 7 Internet Explorer will kill Internet Explorer.

Login for the Web App

Internet Explorer Crash on Login Attempt
It will install some files into the directory C:Programme/Viewer_IPCam(SDL2.dll,Viewer.ocx). SDL2.dll won't reveal anything interesting with a short look in IDA Disassembler: ![Image](http://i.imgur.com/bpIRtZs.png) Viewer.ocx has some interesting strings in it that will reveal some new type of requests to the server: ![Image](http://i.imgur.com/Ch1FEOt.png) Put that into a list with the new info: ``` Viewer 1 327681 -1 39 / http:// DomainList 500 404 29 23 &Language= &AppName= &AppOS= &AppOS &AppVersion= &AppVersion Users/LoginCheck.ashx &DomainList= &Pwd= VersionFlag=1&User= Users/Logout.ashx &SessionID= UserID= Users/AddFriend.ashx &MonitorPwd= &RemarkName= &Groupname= &FriendID= Users/DeleteFriend.ashx &DelFromHisList=0 Users/GetFriendList.ashx &Type= Users/PhoneCheckCode.ashx &PhoneNO= CountryCode= Users/RegisterCheck.ashx &IgnoreSafeWarning= &VerifyCode= &CountryCode= &Email= &RePwd= VersionFlag=1&Pwd= Users/modifyFriendRemarkName.ashx &OldRemarkName= &NewRemarkName= Users/ModifyMonitorPwd.ashx {"error_code":"100100","error":"ÕÒ²»µ½¿ÉÓ÷þÎñÆ÷"} {"error_code":"100101","error":"·¢ËÍÇëÇóʧ°Ü"} ðíHTTP Host: Content-Length: %ld User-Agent: Neeao/4.0 Accept-Encoding: gzip, default Accept-Language: en-us Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/msword, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, */* HTTP/1.0 POST GET Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded ``` Using this rule we can filter only the direct communication of the IPCam: file ip_cam_10.0.1.25 ``` ip.addr == 10.0.1.25 ``` So I collected a list of participating servers with IP and used requests:
videoipcamera.com 218.30.35.92 POST /Users/GetFriendList.ashx POST /Users/AddFriend.ashx
videoipcamera.cn 101.1.17.22 POST /Users/GetFriendList.ashx POST /Users/AddFriend.ashx
upg1.videoipcamera.cn 218.30.35.92 GET /00/06/latestversion.asp
p2p1.videoipcamera.cn 146.0.238.42
api1.videoipcamera.cn 101.1.17.22 POST /Users/LoginCheck.ashx
api2.videoipcamera.cn 218.30.35.92 POST /Users/LoginCheck.ashx
p2p2.videoipcamera.com 218.30.35.92
api3.videoipcamera.cn 101.1.17.22 POST /Users/LoginCheck.ashx
p2p6.videoipcamera.com 101.1.17.22
api4.videoipcamera.com 146.0.238.42 POST /Users/LoginCheck.ashx UDP Port 8000 UDP Port 51880
p2p3.videoipcamera.com 146.0.238.42
p2p4.videoipcamera.com 146.0.238.42
92.42.106.94 UDP Port 4000 UDP Port 4001
p2p5.videoipcamera.com 103.41.127.199 UDP Port 51880 UDP Port 51881
104-250-152-26.static.gorillaservers.com 104.250.152.26 UDP Port 8000 UDP Port 8001
There are some other servers participated talking directly to the IPCam and the Phone over UDP. We can identify some often used UDP Ports on our devices: - Phone => IPCam UDP to 51880 - IPCam => Phone UDP to 5188{0,1,2} Please be cautious, when intended to scan unkown web servers. Your actions could be understand as an attack. ``` # nmap 92.42.106.94 Starting Nmap 7.50 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-08-15 16:29 CEST Nmap scan report for 92.42.106.94 Host is up (0.051s latency). Not shown: 997 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE 3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server 5060/tcp closed sip 5061/tcp closed sip-tls Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 7.72 seconds $ nmap 103.41.127.199 Starting Nmap 7.50 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-08-22 15:13 CEST Nmap scan report for 103.41.127.199 Host is up (0.33s latency). Not shown: 985 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE 80/tcp open http 135/tcp filtered msrpc 139/tcp filtered netbios-ssn 445/tcp filtered microsoft-ds 593/tcp filtered http-rpc-epmap 1025/tcp filtered NFS-or-IIS 3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server 6129/tcp filtered unknown 49152/tcp open unknown 49153/tcp open unknown 49154/tcp open unknown 49155/tcp open unknown 49156/tcp open unknown 49157/tcp open unknown 49165/tcp open unknown Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 40.67 seconds david@greenpc2> ~ $ host 104.250.152.26 26.152.250.104.in-addr.arpa domain name pointer 104-250-152-26.static.gorillaservers.com. david@greenpc2> ~ $ nmap 104.250.152.26 Starting Nmap 7.50 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-08-22 15:18 CEST Nmap scan report for 104-250-152-26.static.gorillaservers.com (104.250.152.26) Host is up (0.24s latency). Not shown: 984 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE 80/tcp open http 135/tcp filtered msrpc 139/tcp filtered netbios-ssn 445/tcp filtered microsoft-ds 593/tcp filtered http-rpc-epmap 1025/tcp filtered NFS-or-IIS 6129/tcp filtered unknown 8080/tcp open http-proxy 9090/tcp open zeus-admin 33899/tcp open unknown 49152/tcp open unknown 49153/tcp open unknown 49154/tcp open unknown 49155/tcp open unknown 49158/tcp open unknown 49159/tcp open unknown Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 30.49 seconds # getting UDP messages like 12:03:01:00:ee:2e:0b:80:8f:d7:ce:7c:d3:c0:52:cc:a1:6d:4e:9e:38:41:09:00 # will send like 13:01:01:00:ee:2e:0b:80:6d:7d:d8:fd:ac:f5:6b:d8:de:58:77:8a:38:41:09:00:01:07 ``` We have some encrypted Info bits, that may will help me on reversing App and firmware: ``` Passwort: => 891A54C4E2EAB52D01C6FBF85A4C143E UserID: 0732910 => -2146750738 Encrypted UDP: 10.0.0.21 -> 10.0.0.27 00:00:00:02:00:00:00:01:00:00:00:50:00:00:00:01:00:09:41:38:00:00:00:07:00:00:00:01:0e:00:00:0f:00:30:61:72:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:2f:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00 Encrypted UDP: 10.0.0.27 -> 146.0.238.42 0c:05:03:00:ee:b6:b9:67:ee:2e:0b:80:3c:88:2a:1d:4e:25:36:4f:9a:44:28:8e:00:00:00:00:e4:74:85:3b Encrypted UDP: 146.0.238.42 -> 10.0.0.27 0d:01:00:00:9a:44:28:8e:b1:e8:c6:af:09:00:00:00:5c:2a:6a:5e:0f:a0:01:01:92:00:ee:2a:ca:a8:01:01:68:fa:98:1a:1f:40:01:01:67:29:7f:c7:ca:a8:01:01:dc:e7:8e:89:22:53:03:01:da:1e:23:5c:22:53:03:01:92:00:ee:2a:22:53:03:01:da:1e:23:5c:2b:5c:04:01:92:00:ee:2a:2b:5c:04:01 ``` This UDP packet payloads are exchanged between smartphone and multiple servers (146.0.238.42,103.41.127.199,104.250.152.26): ``` 0103caa80a00011eee2e0b80b486ca4d073e19397593056b8675f8030001000051000000 0103caa80a00011eee2e0b8024ac620c080cc0b07aa1dce26f79f8030001000051000000 0203caa800000000ee2e0b80b486ca4d073e19397593056b8675f80300010000010000000000000000000000 0203caa800000000ee2e0b8024ac620c080cc0b07aa1dce26f79f80300010000010000000000000000000000 0103caa80a00011eee2e0b806285763d44675edb36ca4289587df8030001000051000000 0103caa80a00011eee2e0b80422226691c0471f66ea96da44381f8030001000051000000 0203caa800000000ee2e0b806285763d44675edb36ca4289587df80300010000010000000000000000000000 0103caa80a00011eee2e0b802792d54f60749ffd12d983af2d85f8030001000051000000 0203caa800000000ee2e0b80422226691c0471f66ea96da44381f80300010000010000000000000000000000 0203caa800000000ee2e0b802792d54f60749ffd12d983af2d85f80300010000010000000000000000000000 ``` This partly cleartext packages was exchanged between IPCam and phone when trying to subscribe an email for an alarm notification: file email_subscribe.cap ``` 0.......p...........8... ....iZo8...Ej.q.iZo(H..........0........N............[o....IC.q..[oPPvop.Po[... ...........433.../..............GVo8.[o............ .....C...U.8.[o..C..........W.sa....6..........`...|E.k........hildagard@temp-mail.de..............................................smtp.gmail.com,173.194.193.108,173.194.67.108...................anabelle@shitmail.de............................................2v..i....i0e....`iZo....`...=8O.^....F..0.......p...........8...Attention: alarm...............................................qDear User, Please check the attached picture for more information.................................sa...|E.k........ ``` ### Reversing ### #### Reversing APK #### 1. JADX 2. APKTOOL 3. Unzip the APK 4. Bytecode Viewer (includes Java Decompiler and some others) https://github.com/Konloch/bytecode-viewer/ ##### 1 . JADX ##### JADX is a decompiler for java executables that will also process apk. You can simply execute the binary of jadx by appending your desired apk. I recognized this: ``` Exception in thread java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space ``` As I work in a VM with low RAM JADX overflows my virtual. By changing the environment variable we can maximize the memory space and using only one thread it will work better. ``` $ JAVA_OPTS="-Xmx1300M" ../tools/jadx/bin/jadx -j 1 Sricam_17.7.17_apk-dl.com.apk ``` But there are a lot of errors on execution of JADX. Although I started in examining the decompiled files. At first glance I will search for JNI (Java Native Interfaces) that could reveal linkings to the library files: ``` oit@ubuntu> ~/doku/Sricam_17.7.17_apk-dl.com $ grep -rli jni . ./com/mediatek/elian/ElianNative.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/g.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/message/g.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/c/e.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/c/j.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/c/b.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/util/c.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/util/s.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/j/d.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/jni/PushSocket.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/jni/BaiduAppSSOJni.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/g/d.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/f.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/config/b.java ./com/xapcamera/SetWifiActivity3.java ./com/tencent/connect/auth/AuthDialog.java ./com/tencent/stat/StatNativeCrashReport.java ./com/tencent/open/web/security/SecureJsInterface.java ./com/tencent/open/web/security/JniInterface.java ./ilnk/lib/IlnkApi.java ``` We can see on first position the native interfaces for the wifi chip. We will look into the paired library file in the unzipping part of the APK. Searching for other interesting strings: ``` oit@ubuntu> ~/doku/Sricam_17.7.17_apk-dl.com $ grep -rli aes . ./cn/jiguang/api/BasePreferenceManager.java ./cn/jiguang/api/JCoreInterface.java ./com/sina/weibo/sdk/cmd/WbAppActivator.java ./com/sina/weibo/sdk/utils/AesEncrypt.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/message/g.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/config/b.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/jni/BaiduAppSSOJni.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/j/a.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/j/d.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/c/j.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/c/e.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/c/b.java oit@ubuntu> ~/doku/Sricam_17.7.17_apk-dl.com/cn/jiguang $ grep -rli encrypt . ./res/layout/activity_modify_npc_bound_email.xml ./res/layout-v11/activity_modify_npc_bound_email.xml ./cn/jiguang/api/BasePreferenceManager.java ./cn/jiguang/c/a/a.java ./cn/jiguang/a/a/b/h.java ./com/google/zxing/client/result/WifiParsedResult.java ./com/xapcamera/entity/Email.java ./com/xapcamera/p2p/SettingListener.java ./com/xapcamera/device/settings/AlarmSetActivity.java ./com/xapcamera/device/settings/ModifyBoundEmailActivity.java ./com/xapcamera/R.java ./com/p2p/core/MediaPlayer.java ./com/p2p/core/P2PHandler.java ./com/p2p/core/utils/DES.java ./com/sina/weibo/sdk/cmd/WbAppActivator.java ./com/sina/weibo/sdk/utils/AesEncrypt.java ./com/sina/weibo/sdk/utils/AidTask.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/message/g.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/util/g.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/util/c.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/jni/BaiduAppSSOJni.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/j/d.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/c/j.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/c/e.java ./com/baidu/android/pushservice/c/b.java ./com/tencent/connect/share/a.java ./com/tencent/connect/auth/AuthAgent.java ./com/tencent/open/SocialApiIml.java ./com/tencent/open/LocationApi.java ./com/tencent/open/utils/AsynLoadImg.java ./com/tencent/open/utils/Util.java ./com/tencent/open/utils/SystemUtils.java ``` BasePreferenceManager.java seems to be interesting. Looking into the sourcecode reveals nothing good: ./com/xapcamera/p2p/SettingListener.java ``` public abstract class BasePreferenceManager { private static final String AES_ENCRYPTION_SEED; private static final String JPUSH_PREF; private static SharedPreferences mSharedPreferences; private static final String[] z; /* JADX: method processing error */ /* Error: java.lang.StackOverflowError ... ``` Checking this with multiple other decompilers lead to the same result. (See in Bytecode Viewer) This file as many others have shortly after beginning some decompiler errors. Some sort of decompiling protection I guess. I don't know enough about Android Reversing, so I can't interprete this the right way at the moment and research doesn't bring good results about this. Another interesting file points to a default user on the p2p server: ``` $ vim lnkConstant.java public static final String P2P_PARAM_DEFAULT_DEVICE_ID = "XXX-000000-XXXXX"; public static final String P2P_PARAM_DEFAULT_DEVICE_NAME = "Node161205"; public static final String P2P_PARAM_DEFAULT_PWD = "admin"; public static final String P2P_PARAM_DEFAULT_SERVER = "EKPNHXIDAUAOEHLOTBSQEJSWPAARTAPKLXPGENLKLUPLHUATSVEESTPFHWIHPDIEHYAOLVEISQLNEGLPPALQHXERELIALKEHEOHZHUEKIFEEEPEJ-$$"; ``` => try out It's possible to checkout the upgrade mechanism for the apk on the upg1 server. But redo all requests from a desktop browser by simply appending the clear strings like "/latestversion.asp" results in 404. ``` $ vim ./com/p2p/core/update/UpdateManager.java ... private static final String UPDATE_URL = "http://upg1.videoipcamera.cn/"; ... public boolean checkUpdate() { ... StringBuilder(UPDATE_URL).append(version_parse[0]).append(HttpUtils.PATHS_SEPARATOR).append(version_parse[1]).append("/latestversion.asp").toString(); ... public String getUpdateDescription() { ... HttpURLConnection connection = (HttpURLConnection) new URL(new StringBuilder(UPDATE_URL).append(version_parse[0]).append(HttpUtils.PATHS_SEPARATOR).append(version_parse[1]).append("/des_html.asp").toString()).openConnection(); .... public void downloadApk(Handler handler, String filePath, String fileName) { ... HttpURLConnection connection = (HttpURLConnection) new URL("http://upg1.videoipcamera.cn//" + version_parse[0] + HttpUtils.PATHS_SEPARATOR + version_parse[1] + HttpUtils.PATHS_SEPARATOR + this.version_server.trim() + ".apk").openConnection(); ... ``` Another interesting file bit is in WXLoginRequest. It reveals another post request "Users/ThirdLogin.ashx" with ID and Token to http://api1.cloudlinks.cn/Users/ThirdLogin.ashx. Overall it reveals the origin of the smartphone app: https://www.yooseecamera.com/ ``` $ vim ./com/xapcamera/network/WXLoginRequest.java params.add(new BasicNameValuePair("AppID", "d591b466644a0420e5f29aefb0cf0088")); params.add(new BasicNameValuePair("AppToken", "2db6962ff0901b8ce771f20f14a651a2786086e55615f951aa0c7c9b33fc5340")); params.add(new BasicNameValuePair("Language", App.application.getResources().getConfiguration().locale.getLanguage())); params.add(new BasicNameValuePair("AppOS", Constants.VIA_TO_TYPE_QQ_DISCUSS_GROUP)); params.add(new BasicNameValuePair("AppName", "com.yoosee")); String[] parseVerson = new String[]{"00", "46", "00", Constants.VIA_REPORT_TYPE_WPA_STATE}; int c = Integer.parseInt(parseVerson[2]) << 8; params.add(new BasicNameValuePair("AppVersion", String.valueOf((((Integer.parseInt(parseVerson[0]) << 24) | (Integer.parseInt(parseVerson[1]) << 16)) | c) | Integer.parseInt(parseVerson[3])))); params.add(new BasicNameValuePair("PackageName", "com.yoosee")); params.add(new BasicNameValuePair("ApiVersion", Constants.VIA_TO_TYPE_QQ_GROUP)); return doPost(params, "Users/ThirdLogin.ashx"); ``` => Trying with curl ##### 2. APKTOOL ##### ``` oit@ubuntu> ~/tools/apktool $ ./apktool -d Sricam_17.7.17_apk-dl.com.apk ``` APKTool will generate smali files from the APK. Smali is a readable format of the dalvik executable dex file. As JADX isn't capable of disassembling all files it could be fruitful to look at the smali files. It looks like kind of assembler. Looking into the smali file of BasePreferenceManager.smali we recognize some constant strings: ``` .method static constructor ()V .locals 14 const/16 v9, 0x35 const/16 v10, 0x11 const/4 v8, 0x4 const/4 v12, 0x1 const/4 v1, 0x0 const-string v2, "W#F\u0013titY\u0008p`\u0016\\\u0005ce(L]+n9Z\u0015t5k\u0004" ``` But they have no typical length for a IV or a AES key. The strings.xml file could be very useful, as it includes nearly all constant strings, that are used in the Java apk. But doesn't reveal anything new. ``` $ vim ./res/values/strings.xml ``` ##### 3. Unzip the APK ##### Simply unzipping the apk will unpack it's resources for Linking and Compiling and reveals DEX binary and the native ARM libraries. We can use the compiled dalvic executable dex file to convert it to a smali. We can use the dex file to repack it to a jar file. The Bytecode Viewer will do exactly this. For now I will simply examining the shared objects files for interesting functions by using information from previous findings. ``` $ r2 libelianjni.so [0x00004b90]> afl ... 0x000059a8 12 290 sym.RT_AES_KeyExpansion 0x00005ad8 43 604 sym.RT_AES_Encrypt 0x00005d4c 42 540 sym.RT_AES_Decrypt 0x00005f80 12 230 sym.RT_HMAC_SHA1 0x0000606c 1 42 sym.RT_SHA1_Init 0x0000609c 15 412 sym.RT_SHA1_Hash 0x00006248 6 96 sym.RT_SHA1_Append 0x000062a8 5 174 sym.RT_SHA1_End 0x00006358 3 72 sym.RT_SHA1 ... ``` [0x0000597c]> s sym.elianStart sym.createV1Packet sym.createV2Packet sym.RT_AES_Encrypt ``` But the binaries are really big and cannot be handled easily. ##### 4. Bytecode Viewer ##### Bytecode Viewer runs into the same errors as JADX and won't give new information: ![Image](http://i.imgur.com/xXLwCwn.png) ### Overall Security Issues ### #### Links for collections #### http://imgur.com/a/yjUfI http://imgur.com/a/BvP18