Last active
October 10, 2025 15:51
-
-
Save Darkflib/22f0a85430d0ee4c7c323cd5c2417732 to your computer and use it in GitHub Desktop.
Revisions
-
Darkflib revised this gist
Oct 10, 2025 . 1 changed file with 66 additions and 0 deletions.There are no files selected for viewing
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters. Learn more about bidirectional Unicode charactersOriginal file line number Diff line number Diff line change @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ Short version: the UK and US regimes are broadly compatible in intent and practice. If you build to modern NIST 800-53/171 + FIPS-valid crypto on the US side and follow NCSC guidance (CAF/Cloud Principles/Cyber Essentials) with UK-GDPR controls on the UK side, you’ll rarely hit hard incompatibilities. Differences are mostly in classification labels, assurance schemes, and privacy law plumbing. # How the UK lines up with the US stack | Area | Rough US anchor | Rough UK anchor | How they compare | | --------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Risk & control framework** | NIST CSF + SP 800-53 baselines | **NCSC CAF** (4 objectives, 14 principles) used for CNI/NIS assessments | Same philosophy: risk-led, outcomes-based; CAF ≈ NIST CSF with UK wording and “Indicators of Good Practice.” ([NCSC][1]) | | **System / data classification** | FIPS 199 (Low/Moderate/High) | **HMG Government Security Classifications** (OFFICIAL / SECRET / TOP SECRET; “OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE” is a handling caveat, not a tier) | Both drive baseline protections by impact; labels differ; no 1:1 mapping, but conceptually akin. ([GOV.UK][2]) | | **Minimum security baselines** | FIPS 200 + 800-53 control families | **GovS 007 Security** + **Cyber Security Standard** (successor/companion to MCSS) | Both specify mandatory outcomes for government bodies/suppliers; language differs, intent aligns. ([UK Government Security - Beta][3]) | | **Crypto in transit** | NIST SP 800-52 (TLS), FIPS 140-3 modules | **NCSC TLS guidance**; prefer TLS 1.2/1.3 and strong suites | Algorithm choices and hardening advice are near-identical; the UK does **not** mandate FIPS validation. ([NCSC][4]) | | **Cloud security** | FedRAMP overlays on NIST 800-53 | **NCSC 14 Cloud Security Principles** (widely adopted; vendor mappings exist) | Principles overlap FedRAMP themes (identity, separation, logging, supply-chain). ([NCSC][5]) | | **Critical infrastructure law** | FISMA; sector rules; CISA directives | **NIS Regulations** (UK), assessed with CAF; Ofcom oversight for telcos via **Telecoms Security Act** | Similar objectives; different regulators/terminology. ([NCSC][6]) | | **General privacy law** | Sectoral (HIPAA/GLBA/FTC) + state privacy acts | **UK-GDPR + Data Protection Act 2018** | UK places stricter formalities on lawful basis, DPIAs, breach timelines; architecturally compatible. ([ICO][7]) | | **Public-sector entry-level bar** | CIS/SOC2 often used commercially | **Cyber Essentials / CE Plus** (5 technical controls; CE+ adds audit) | CE is lighter than NIST/FedRAMP; good hygiene bar, not a full framework. ([NCSC][8]) | # Communications-specific expectations in the UK (what to build to) 1. **TLS 1.2/1.3 only, strong suites, cert hygiene** — follow NCSC’s TLS hardening; align ciphers and disable legacy features/downgrades. For gov email, see the UK guidance on TLS for external services (plus MTA-STS/TLS-RPT for visibility). ([NCSC][4]) 2. **Identity & mutual auth** — match NCSC cloud principles on identity/authn, admin interfaces, and external interfaces; this is comparable to NIST 800-53 IA/SC families. ([NCSC][5]) 3. **Logging & alerting** — NCSC cloud principle 13; parallels NIST AU controls. ([NCSC][5]) 4. **Separation and least privilege** — multi-tenant separation, minimal admin paths; again mirrors NIST SC/AC families. ([NCSC][5]) 5. **For telcos** — the **Telecommunications Security Act** + **Code of Practice** adds prescriptive duties and Ofcom oversight (audits, timelines). If you’re a provider, you must meet these. ([Legislation.gov.uk][9]) # Where teams usually worry about “incompatibility” * **FIPS-validated crypto modules** *US:* agencies often **require** FIPS 140-2/-3 validated modules. *UK:* NCSC does **not** require FIPS validation per se for most OFFICIAL workloads; it requires secure configurations and proven algorithms. If you already use FIPS-validated libraries (OpenSSL FIPS provider, BoringCrypto FIPS build, cloud HSMs), that’s acceptable in the UK; it’s simply not a label they insist on. Net: not incompatible; UK is generally more flexible on **validation** while equally strict on **outcomes**. ([NCSC][4]) * **Classification labels and inheritance** FIPS 199 (L/M/H) vs HMG (OFFICIAL/SECRET/TOP SECRET) are conceptually similar but **not** a formal cross-walk. Treat them as separate scoping exercises and record your rationale if you “translate.” ([GOV.UK][2]) * **Regulatory scope for comms providers** If you’re a UK **telecoms** provider, the TSA/Code of Practice imposes duties (design, operation, incident reporting) that don’t map 1:1 to any US federal baseline. Architecturally compatible, but **extra obligations** exist (e.g., Ofcom reporting). ([Legislation.gov.uk][9]) * **Privacy governance** UK-GDPR/DPA 2018 expect DPIAs, lawful basis, data-subject rights, and cross-border transfer mechanisms (IDTA or UK addendum to SCCs). US sectoral laws don’t conflict technically, but the **paperwork and lawful-basis artefacts** are UK-specific. Plan your records of processing, retention, and data-sharing agreements accordingly. ([ICO][7]) # Practical build advice (works in both jurisdictions) * **Baseline to NIST 800-53 Moderate + NCSC Cloud Principles**; keep a mapping sheet to CAF principles and HMG classifications for UK, and to FIPS 199/200 for US. It simplifies audits and supplier security reviews. ([NCSC][5]) * **Use FIPS-validated crypto where feasible** (gets you US checkmarks) and configure it per **NCSC TLS guidance** (meets UK hardening). ([NCSC][4]) * **For NHS data or NHSmail access** attach the **DSP Toolkit** annually; note DSPT is aligning with CAF. ([NHS England Digital][10]) * **If you’re a comms provider in the UK**, track the **Telecoms Security Code of Practice** updates under TSA; Ofcom’s role is expanding and timelines apply. ([www.ofcom.org.uk][11]) # Bottom line * **Compatibility:** High. The UK’s NCSC (CAF, Cloud Principles, TLS guidance) and GovS 007 mirror the NIST/FIPS worldview, with UK-specific governance and privacy overlays. * **Incompatibilities:** None that force design changes for normal enterprise workloads. The main differences are assurance labels (FIPS validation vs UK outcome-based guidance), classification schemes, and sector-specific compliance (NHS DSPT, TSA for telcos). * **What to do:** Build to strong NIST controls with FIPS-validated crypto, configure to NCSC TLS/cloud guidance, map to CAF and UK-GDPR, and keep auditable rationales for any translations or compensating controls. If you want, I can generate a one-page **US↔UK control-mapping CSV** (CAF principles ↔ NIST 800-53 families ↔ example evidence) for your GRC repo. **Confidence: 0.82** [1]: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Cyber Assessment Framework - NCSC.GOV.UK" [2]: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-security-classifications/government-security-classifications-policy-html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Government Security Classifications Policy (HTML)" [3]: https://www.security.gov.uk/policy-and-guidance/the-cyber-security-standard/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "The Cyber Security Standard" [4]: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/using-tls-to-protect-data?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Using TLS to protect data" [5]: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/the-cloud-security-principles?utm_source=chatgpt.com "The cloud security principles - NCSC.GOV.UK" [6]: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework/caf-supplementary-information?utm_source=chatgpt.com "CAF Supplementary information - NCSC.GOV.UK" [7]: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-and-the-eu/data-protection-and-the-eu-in-detail/the-uk-gdpr/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "The UK GDPR | ICO" [8]: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberessentials/overview?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Cyber Essentials - NCSC.GOV.UK" [9]: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/31/contents?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021" [10]: https://digital.nhs.uk/services/data-security-and-protection-toolkit?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Data Security and Protection Toolkit" [11]: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/internet-based-services/network-security/ofcom-begins-new-role-overseeing-security-of-telecoms-networks?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Ofcom begins new role overseeing security of telecoms ..." -
Oct 10, 2025 . 2 changed files with 88 additions and 0 deletions.There are no files selected for viewing
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters. Learn more about bidirectional Unicode charactersOriginal file line number Diff line number Diff line change @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ Here’s a **cross-mapping reference** showing how the key **FIPS**, **NIST SP 800-53**, **PCI-DSS 4.0**, and **ISO/IEC 27001:2022** domains align conceptually. It’s simplified for design and audit-planning purposes — it doesn’t replace the official mappings, but it helps you see equivalences and potential compliance inheritance. --- ## 🧩 Cross-Mapping Overview | **Objective** | **FIPS Standard** | **NIST SP 800-53 (Rev 5)** | **PCI-DSS 4.0 Control Areas** | **ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A Controls** | **Comment / Practical Note** | | --------------------------------------------- | ------------------------- | -------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Security Categorization** | FIPS 199 | RA-2 (“Security Categorization”) | 12.5 (“Manage security incidents”) + Context & scoping reqs | 5.9 (Information classification) | Determines system “Low/Moderate/High” baseline and drives control selection. | | **Minimum Security Requirements / Baselines** | FIPS 200 | PM-11, PL-2, RA-3 – RA-5 | 12 (Information security policy), 6 (Network security) | 5.1–5.3 (ISMS framework), A.5.1 (IS policy) | Establishes baseline controls and tailoring principles. | | **Access Control** | — (covered by 200) | AC-1 → AC-22 | 7 (Restrict access to system components and cardholder data) | A.5.15–A.5.18 | Covers authentication, authorisation, session management, least privilege. | | **Audit & Accountability** | — | AU-1 → AU-14 | 10 (Track and monitor all access) | A.8.15 – A.8.16 | Log retention, integrity, monitoring, audit trails. | | **Identification & Authentication** | — | IA-1 → IA-12 | 8 (Identify and authenticate access to system components) | A.5.17 – A.5.18 | MFA, password policy, cryptographic identity verification. | | **System & Communications Protection** | FIPS 140-3 (crypto) + 200 | SC-1 → SC-44 | 4 (Protect cardholder data in transit and at rest) | A.8.23 – A.8.25 | Requires approved crypto (TLS 1.2+, AES, SHA-2/3, etc.) and secure channels. | | **Configuration Management / Change Control** | — | CM-1 → CM-14 | 6 (Develop and maintain secure systems and software) | A.8.9 – A.8.10 | Baseline configuration, version control, approval workflows. | | **Incident Response** | — | IR-1 → IR-9 | 12.10 (Response procedures) | A.5.29 – A.5.30 | Detection, reporting, containment, lessons learned. | | **Contingency / Continuity Planning** | — | CP-1 → CP-13 | 12.10.5 (Recovery from incidents) | A.5.29 – A.5.30 + A.5.31 | Backup, recovery, redundancy, DR testing. | | **Risk Assessment / Management** | — | RA-1 → RA-9 | 12.2 (Risk assessment process) | A.5.4 – A.5.6 | Continuous risk identification and mitigation plan. | | **Personnel Security / Training** | — | AT-1 → AT-6 ; PS-1 → PS-8 | 12.6 (Security awareness) | A.6.3 – A.6.4 | Staff vetting, onboarding, awareness training. | | **Physical & Environmental Protection** | — | PE-1 → PE-20 | 9 (Restrict physical access) | A.7.1 – A.7.10 | Locks, CCTV, visitor logs, off-site media handling. | | **Maintenance / Secure Disposal** | — | MA-1 → MA-6 ; MP-6 → MP-7 | 9.8 (Destroy media when no longer needed) | A.8.12 – A.8.13 | Secure wipe, degauss, physical destruction procedures. | | **Program Management / Governance** | — | PM-1 → PM-33 | 12.1 (IS policy and management) | 5.1–5.3 (Governance and leadership) | ISMS governance, accountability, continuous improvement. | | **Privacy / Data Minimisation** | — | Appendix J (Privacy controls) | 3 (Minimise stored cardholder data) | A.8.11 – A.8.22 | Modern addition in NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 – privacy engineering alignment. | --- ### 🧠 Key Takeaways 1. **FIPS 199 + 200 → NIST SP 800-53 baselines** FIPS doesn’t define *how* to meet controls, just *that you must*. SP 800-53 supplies the implementation specifics. 2. **PCI-DSS and ISO 27001 overlap strongly** PCI emphasises transactional and network security; ISO emphasises governance and process. Both map comfortably to NIST control families. 3. **Audit simplification strategy** * Adopt **NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Moderate baseline** as your internal master set. * Maintain a mapping spreadsheet to PCI/ISO clauses. * Document compensating controls where full equivalence isn’t exact (e.g. PCI’s cardholder-specific items). * Evidence via configuration management (IaC manifests, control test results, and policy artefacts). 4. **Practical bonus:** FedRAMP, CMMC, and SOC 2 Trust Criteria can all be layered on top of the same mappings with <10–15 % additional effort once this foundation exists. --- Would you like me to produce a **CSV-formatted control-mapping table** (FIPS → NIST → PCI → ISO) suitable for import into a compliance tracker or GRC system? It’s handy if you want to automate gap-analysis or generate audit artefacts. This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters. Learn more about bidirectional Unicode charactersOriginal file line number Diff line number Diff line change @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ So essentially, use it as a baseline, deviate if unavoidable, document compensating controls, and be auditable and decisions defendable for future compliance. I think most of the things I have read would suggest that if you are compliant on other more modern requirements - NIST 800 series, PCI-DSS et al. you are likely going to be compliant anyway. --- Yes — that’s an accurate and succinct interpretation. FIPS is essentially the *federal lingua franca* of minimum assurance. The principles you summarised capture its intent perfectly: 1. **Baseline not ceiling:** FIPS defines a *minimum* standard, not a full-spectrum prescription. Think of it as the “lowest common denominator” for acceptable federal-grade crypto and control hygiene. 2. **Deviation is fine if justified:** If a requirement cannot be met (say, because of a newer cryptographic primitive or a cloud service limitation), you can deviate — but you must document: * *why* the deviation exists, * *how* you mitigate the risk (compensating controls), and * *when* you’ll revisit it. This is part of the “Plan of Action and Milestones” (POA&M) process under FISMA / RMF. 3. **Auditable and defensible:** The goal is not box-ticking but *traceability*. An assessor should be able to see the rationale chain: data classification → applicable controls → implementation → evidence. If your decisions are well-documented, risk-based, and defensible, you’re operating in the spirit of FIPS/NIST, not just the letter. 4. **Overlap with modern frameworks:** Correct again: if you’re already meeting more modern or stringent frameworks (e.g. **NIST SP 800-171/53**, **ISO 27001**, **SOC 2**, **PCI-DSS 4.0**, or **CIS Controls v8**), then you’ll usually satisfy the FIPS family *implicitly*. * FIPS 199/200 map directly to NIST SP 800-53’s baseline control families. * FIPS 140-3 is the same crypto requirement embedded within PCI-DSS, FedRAMP, and DoD’s CMMC. * The main gaps tend to be procedural — documentation, control inheritance, and boundary definitions. 5. **Ecosystem alignment:** Many sectors (DoD, FedRAMP, DOJ, state agencies) still require the *label* “FIPS-validated crypto modules” even when your actual implementation is functionally identical, so it’s often worth selecting libraries that are explicitly validated (e.g. OpenSSL FIPS Object Module or AWS CloudHSM). In short: treat FIPS as your **floor**, NIST 800 as your **framework**, and PCI-DSS / ISO 27001 / CIS as your **cross-industry alignment layer**. If your system design can pass scrutiny under any of those regimes, you’re effectively FIPS-compliant by construction. Would you like me to outline a small cross-mapping table (FIPS → NIST 800-53 → PCI-DSS → ISO 27001) to show where the controls line up? It’s quite useful when designing audit documentation. -
Oct 10, 2025 .There are no files selected for viewing
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters. Learn more about bidirectional Unicode charactersOriginal file line number Diff line number Diff line change @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ Here is a simplified, accessible summary of the **FIPS** (Federal Information Processing Standards) regime, and a sketch of other U.S. security / communications rules you should know — plus caveats. (If you like, I can also show how these compare with UK/EU equivalents.) --- ## What are FIPS / the FIPS “data-processing guidelines”? FIPS are a set of standards published by NIST (the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology) for use by U.S. federal agencies — and often by their contractors and vendors — especially when handling sensitive information. ([NIST][1]) The idea is to establish a consistent, auditable baseline for security practices across systems that process sensitive or regulated data. Here are key elements and rules in FIPS that relate to data processing and communications: | FIPS / Related Standard | Purpose / Focus | Key Requirements / Points | | ------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **FIPS 199 (Security Categorization)** | Defines how to categorise information and systems (for confidentiality, integrity, availability) | Systems/information are rated as **Low / Moderate / High** along C, I, A dimensions. The “highest” rating across those determines the system’s overall categorisation. ([NIST Publications][2]) | | **FIPS 200 (Minimum Security Requirements)** | Specifies mandatory security objectives (controls) that federal agencies must meet | Agencies must implement a baseline set of management, operational, and technical controls (drawn from NIST SP 800-53) appropriate to the system’s categorization. ([NIST Publications][3]) | | **FIPS 140-2 / 140-3 (Cryptographic Module Security)** | Sets requirements for cryptographic modules (hardware or software) used in systems | Defines levels of assurance (from 1 to 4), physical and logical protection, key management, roles, etc. ([Microsoft Learn][4]) <br>FIPS 140-3 is the newer version, replacing 140-2. ([Wikipedia][5]) | | **FIPS 201 (Personal Identity / PIV)** | Specifies identity credentials (Personal Identity Verification) for federal employees and contractors | Defines smart card / credentialing, processes, interoperability, etc. (less directly about communications security) ([NIST Publications][3]) | Beyond pure FIPS, the FIPS framework is usually implemented in conjunction with **NIST SP 800-series** guidelines (which detail how to implement, assess, tailor controls, etc.). For example: * **NIST SP 800-53** — “Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations”: a catalogue of controls (access control, audit, incident response, encryption, etc.). ([NIST Computer Security Resource Center][6]) * **NIST SP 800-37** — Risk Management Framework (RMF): outlines how to integrate security and risk management over a system’s life cycle. ([Wikipedia][7]) So “FIPS data-processing guidelines” is a loose way of referring to the set of compulsory standards (FIPS 199, 200, 140-2/3, etc.) plus the supporting NIST guidance that together govern how data is handled, encrypted, categorised, audited, etc. ### What it means in practice (for someone unfamiliar) * If you build or supply a system that handles sensitive or regulated data for a U.S. federal agency (or in many cases a contractor doing federal work), your cryptographic modules (e.g. TLS libraries, key stores, HSM interfaces) often need to be **FIPS-validated** (i.e. tested and certified). * You must categorise the data/services (Low/Moderate/High) and apply the “baseline” controls matching that category. * You should adopt procedural, operational, and technical controls (access, logging, key management, backups, incident response) as dictated by NIST SP 800 series. * For communications between parties: you must use approved cryptographic standards, follow secure key management, protect confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, etc. * You must maintain auditability, show proof of compliance, and support assessments and certification. Because FIPS was never intended to cover *everything* (e.g. physical security, policy, privacy in full, etc.), an implementing organisation often has to layer additional controls and guidance outside the strict FIPS walls. --- ## Other U.S. security / communications guidelines you should know When two parties communicate in the U.S., especially across sensitive or regulated domains, simply “FIPS” compliance is often not enough. Here are key standards, frameworks, and regulatory drivers: | Framework / Rule | Scope | What it demands (relevant to communication or data exchange) | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **FISMA / FISMA Modernization Act** | Requires federal agencies (and their partners) to secure information systems | Requires risk-based programmes, inventorying systems, categorization (FIPS 199), applying baseline controls (FIPS 200 / NIST SP 800), ongoing monitoring, assessments. ([Wikipedia][8]) | | **NIST SP 800-171 (“Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information”)** | Applies to non-federal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI (Controlled Unclassified Information) on behalf of the U.S. government | Demands specific controls for confidentiality, system / communications protection, etc. This is often invoked in defense / contracting contexts. ([ibsscorp.com][9]) | | **CMMC (Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification)** | Defense supply chain standard | Imposes controlled requirements (largely based on NIST SP 800-171) for contractors communicating with the DoD, etc. ([Tyto Athene][10]) | | **NIST SP 800-52, 800-38, etc.** | Guidance for TLS, cryptographic standards, modes, key derivation, accepted algorithms | Ensures communications use appropriate, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms, modes, acceptable key lengths, etc. | | **Various sectoral/regulatory laws** (e.g. HIPAA, FTC, GLBA, etc.) | Health, financial, consumer data, privacy | May require encryption in transit, encryption at rest, data integrity, audit trails, etc. E.g. under health law (HIPAA), when sending patient data, you often need TLS, logging, access control, etc. | | **Telecommunication / Communications infrastructure rules** | For backbone networks, critical infrastructure etc. | There are guidelines for securing telecom network elements (e.g. NIST SP 800-13 “Telecommunication Security Guidelines”) ([NIST Computer Security Resource Center][11]) <br>Also rules under FCC / U.S. communications law about supply chain risk, prohibited equipment (e.g. “Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act”) ([Wikipedia][12]) | | **Zero Trust / newer modern architectures** | Not mandatory law (yet) but strongly recommended | NIST SP 800-207 offers a model of “never trust, always verify” and insists “all communication is secured regardless of network location.” ([CyberArk][13]) | | **Protected Distribution Systems (PDS) / NSTISSI 7003** | For classified-level communication lines | If two parties share classified info (in high-sensitivity settings), physical and electronic safeguards over the communication link (shielding, tamper detection, carrier systems) are mandated. ([Wikipedia][14]) | ### What matters most in secure communications between parties From a practical standpoint, when you’re designing or assessing communication between two parties in a U.S. regulated context, these are typically required or expected: 1. **Use of approved cryptographic algorithms / modules** — e.g. FIPS-validated modules, TLS 1.2/1.3 in specified modes, no weak ciphers, proper key sizes 2. **Mutual authentication / identity verification** — ensure both ends know who they’re talking to (certificates, mutual TLS, token-based auth) 3. **Integrity protection / message authentication** — MACs, digital signatures 4. **Confidentiality (encryption in transit)** — typically TLS or IPsec, with modern cipher suites 5. **Perfect forward secrecy** (when possible) — avoid reuse of ephemeral keys 6. **Replay protection / anti-replay / timestamping / nonces** — to guard against replay attacks 7. **Key management, rotation, revocation** — how keys are generated, stored, protected, rotated, revoked 8. **Audit, logging, monitoring** — you need evidence of what communications occurred, errors, failures, anomalies 9. **Protocol / negotiation safety** — avoid downgrade, downgrade attacks, etc. 10. **Continuous monitoring / risk assessment / patching** — even once deployed, communications must be re-evaluated. --- ## Caveats / things to watch out for * **“FIPS compliance” is not a guarantee of full security** — it addresses a core subset of cryptographic and control requirements, but many risks (e.g. business logic flaws, insider risk, side channels) lie outside its formal scope. * **Transition periods / legacy modules** — some older modules (FIPS 140-2) are still valid in “historical” or transitional mode, but the shift to 140-3 is ongoing. ([Wikipedia][5]) * **Tailoring is allowed** — NIST guidance generally encourages tailoring controls based on risk; you don’t always have to accept the full default baseline if you can justify exceptions. * **Sectoral overlay rules may demand stricter requirements** — for example, in defense, in healthcare, in telecom, etc. * **Contractual obligations** may force you to adopt additional controls beyond what law demands. --- If you like, I can produce a **“plain-English checklist**** specifically for communication between two parties engaging under U.S. regulated (federal / contractor) settings. Do you want me to do that? **Confidence: 0.87** [1]: https://www.nist.gov/federal-information-processing-standards-fips?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Federal information processing standards (FIPS) | NIST" [2]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.199.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com "FIPS 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal ..." [3]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com "NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf" [4]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/compliance/regulatory/offering-fips-140-2?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) ..." [5]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIPS_140-3?utm_source=chatgpt.com "FIPS 140-3" [6]: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final?utm_source=chatgpt.com "NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 - Security and Privacy Controls for ..." [7]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_Management_Framework?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Risk Management Framework" [8]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Information_Security_Management_Act_of_2002?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002" [9]: https://ibsscorp.com/nist-sp-800-171-system-and-communications-protection/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "NIST SP 800-171 – System and Communications Protection" [10]: https://gotyto.com/thought-leadership/a-quick-guide-to-nist-sp-800-53-nist-sp-800-171-cmmc-and-fedramp/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "A Quick Guide to NIST 800-53, NIST 800-171, CMMC, & ..." [11]: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/13/final?utm_source=chatgpt.com "SP 800-13, Telecommunications Security Guidelines for ..." [12]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_and_Trusted_Communications_Networks_Act_of_2019?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019" [13]: https://www.cyberark.com/what-is/nist-sp-800-207-cybersecurity-framework/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "What is the NIST SP 800-207 cybersecurity framework?" [14]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protective_distribution_system?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Protective distribution system"