Hector Martin marcan

Install restic and autorestic
sudo mkdir -p /var/cache/restic
Set up /etc/autorestic.yml roughly as follows:

backends:
    mybackend:
        # Your backend options here, see the documentation
global:
    all:
        cache-dir: /var/cache/restic

ARM defines ACTLR_EL[321] as implementation defined.

Apple adds an IMPDEF ACTLR_EL12 as s3_6_c15_c14_6 and effectively implements VHE semantics. This does not seem to violate the architecture, since the register contents are IMPDEF anyway so nothing says they can't alias ACTLR_EL1 and ACTLR_EL2 together in EL2.

ACTLR_EL1 is trapped by HCR_EL2.TACR. It is also trapped by HACR_EL2<0> (which has all the controls for fine-grained Apple IMPDEF stuff).

In addition, AIDR_EL1 contains feature bits for Apple IMPDEF functionality. It is identical in EL1 and EL2 and is trapped by HCR_EL2.TID1 and HACR_EL2<4>.

TSO

Colorspaces

Tested with 10-bit mode on KDE on an M1 Pro.

12:
- 10-bit mode: 0..1023
- 8-bit mode: 0..255
- Likely native primaries
  - Actually seems to be P3?

	# CephFS pool/layout migration tool ("transcoder")
	#
	# Loosely inspired by:
	# https://git.sr.ht/~pjjw/cephfs-layout-tool/tree/master/item/cephfs_layout_tool/migrate_pools.py
	# https://gist.github.com/ervwalter/5ff6632c930c27a1eb6b07c986d7439b
	#
	# MIT license (https://opensource.org/license/mit)

	import os, stat, time, signal, shutil, logging, sys
	from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor

	#
	# Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
	# Linux/arm64 6.6.0 Kernel Configuration
	#
	CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (GCC) 13.2.1 20231011 (Red Hat 13.2.1-4)"
	CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y
	CONFIG_GCC_VERSION=130201
	CONFIG_CLANG_VERSION=0
	CONFIG_AS_IS_GNU=y
	CONFIG_AS_VERSION=23900

	import struct, time
	## This experiment demonstrates that the claimed "hash" (that is not a hash) used
	## by the L2 cache ECC debug feature used by Operation Triangulation is not secure,
	## and can be trivially reverse engineered by anyone who owns one of the machines
	## with the hardware (such as any M1 Mac), in seconds to days. Therefore, this proves
	## that no "insider" access or leak is necessary to obtain this table, and that the
	## attackers most likely did exactly the same thing.

	## This is the "black box", i.e. the hardware: The table is not exposed to the caller.
	class BlackBox:

	0x000 1 isTiled
	0x001 1 isTearingAllowed
	0x002 1 isPremultiplied
	0x003 4 planeCount
	0x007 4 planeCount2
	0x00b 4 pixelFormat
	0x00f 4 YCbCrMatrix
	0x013 1 transferFunctionIndex
	13 == SDR
	16 == HDR

	import tweepy, json, time, sys

	auth = tweepy.OAuth1UserHandler(
	<api keys here>
	)

	api = tweepy.API(auth)

	d = json.loads(open(sys.argv[1]).read().split("=", 1)[1])

	# /etc/udev/rules.d/90-usb-nvme.rules

	# Adjust ID_MODEL to match your enclosure
	SUBSYSTEM=="block", KERNEL=="sd*", ENV{ID_MODEL}=="ASM236X_NVME", IMPORT{program}="/usr/local/bin/nvme-usb-id $tempnode"

	#!/bin/sh
	set -e

	ROOT=remotes/origin

	total=0
	for i in $(git for-each-ref --format="%(refname:short)" refs/$ROOT/bits/); do
	name="${i##*/}"
	base=$ROOT/base
	if git rev-parse --verify "$ROOT/bases/$name" &>/dev/null; then